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Abstract 
Theories of protection powerful enough to resolve security 
questions of computer systems are considered. Mo single theory 
of protection is adequate for proving whether the security 
afforded by an arbitrary protection system suffices to safeguard 
data from unauthorized access. When theories of protection are 
restricted' to computer systems which are bounded in size, 
adequate theories exist, but they are inherently intractable. 
The implications of these results are discussed. 
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1. In trod uct ion 
No existing computer system is completely secure. None has 
withstood penetration. None can truthfully claim complete 
protection of files and other confidential user objects. Most 
computers are, in fact, easily compromised. Have designers 
somehow paid insufficient attention to security policies and 
mechanisms? Or is it inherently difficult to determine whether a 
given security policy and mechanism is safe, that is, whether it 
can provide a proper degree of safety for user objects? 
V'e consider the prospects for developing a comprehensive 
theory of protection (or even a finite number of such theories) 
sufficiently general to enable proofs or disproofs of safety for 
arbitrary protection systems. Not surprisingly, we can show that 
there is no decidable theory adequate for proving all 
propositions about safety. To bring these results closer to 
practice, we also consider theories of protection for computer 
systems which are bounded in size. Here there are decidable 
theories adequate for proving all propositions about safety. 
However, proving safety intrinsically requires enumerating all 
conceivable ways in which safety may be compromised, and hence 
may use enormous amounts of time or space to reach a conclusion. 
These results must be interpreted carefully. They are about 
the fundamental limits of our abilities to demonstrate that 
protection systems are safe. They do not rule out the 
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possibility that we can construct individual protection systems 
and prove that they are safe, or that we can find practical 
restrictions on protection systems which make safety questions 
tractable. Yet, these results do suggest that systems without 
severe restrictions on their operation will have safety questions 
too expensive to answer. Thus we may be forced to shift our 
concern from proving whether or not protection systems are 
completely safe to proving whether breaches in security are 
sufficiently costly to deter concerted attacks. 
Our results are obtained by applying known results from 
logic and complexity theory to questions of safety for protection 
systems. The transferability of such results shows that 
questions concerning safety are much more difficult to answer 
than many might have believed. 
2. Access control models of protection systems 
Protection systems encompass two kinds of policies and 
mechanisms for enforcing them. Access control policies regulate 
the right of access to objects in the system; flow control 
policies regulate the dissemination of information among the 
objects of the system. Since flow cannot occur without access, 
flow control problems are at least as difficult as access control 
problems. Accordingly, wo will limit ourselves in this paper to 
safety problems with access control policies. 
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An access control policy specifies a set of objects, a set 
of domains of access to these objects, a set of generic rights to 
objects, and a niethqij of binding processes to domains. An access 
P.^.liH^i state is defined by a given distribution of generic 
rights; it can be envisaged as an access matrix whose rows 
correspond to domains and columns to objects. A process 
operating in domain d may use an object x in.a particular way 
only if a generic right enabling that action appears in the 
access matrix at position (d,x). Some rights govern when 
processes may change the access control state. 
A protection system comprises an access control policy 
together with an enforcement mechanism for the policy. 
Enforcement mechanisms are judged by the criteria of security and 
precision. A mechanism is secure if it disables all operations 
prohibited by the policy; it is precise if it is secure and 
enables all operations permitted by the policy. The number of 
permitted operations disabled is a measure of a mechanism's 
imprecision. Whereas most systems may be able to tolerate some 
lack of precision, few can tolerate a lack of security. 
The users of a system demand more than security or 
precision. They demand that both policy and mechanism be safe; 
that is, no process should be able to acquire a right to an 
object in violation of the declared intentions of the object's 
owner. An example of an unsafe, but secure, system is a 
capability machine which imposes no restrictions on capability 
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passing; this permits processes validly to acquire capabilities 
(i.e., rights) for objects without permission from the objects' 
owners. In contrast, a system that allows no sharing of objects 
at all would be safe, but of little interest where shared access 
to data bases is important. V.'e. are less interested in whether 
enforcement mechanisms are secure or precise than we are in 
whether the access control policy and its enforcement mechanism 
are safe. 
Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullrnan [HRU76] showed that it is 
undecidable whether a given, arbitrary protection system is safe. 
In their model, the safety question is formulated by asking "Can 
a specific right r be placed in the access matrix at a specific 
position (d,x)?". Should the answer to this question be "yes", 
the system is unsafe since the right r to x can be "leaked'' 
to d. The generality of their result is underscored by the 
simplicity of their model of a protection system. Their model 
allows only a few primitive commands. Each command verifies that 
certain generic rights are present in the access matrix and, if 
so, performs one or more elementrary operations that may alter 
the state of the access matrix. Elementary operations allow 
creating or deleting objects or domains, and placing generic 
rights in, or removing them from, the access matrix. The 
undecidability of the safety question was established by showing 
how to transform the halting problem for an arbitrary Turing 
machine into a safety question; the construction shows how the 
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sequence of configurations of an access control matrix can 
simulate the configurations of a Turing machine, with the generic 
right of interest being placed in the access matrix position of 
interest if and only if the Turing machine halts. We state 
without proof their major results. 
The_or̂ rri 2 . T h e set of saTe protection systems is not 
recursive . 
Theorem 2_._2. The set of unsafe protection systems is 
recursively enumerable. 
Theorem 2.3. When no new objects or domains of access can 
be created, the set of safe protection systems is recursive and 
its decision problem is complete in polynomial space. 
The first theorem is equivalent to saying that it is 
undecidable whether a given protection system is safe. The 
second theorem states that we can generate a list of all unsafe 
systems; this could be done by systematically enumerating all 
protection systems and all sequences of commands in each system, 
outputting the description of any system for which there is a 
sequence of commands causing a leak. We cannot, however, also 
enumerate all safe systems, for a set is recursive if and only if 
both it and its complement are recursively enumerable. The third 
theorem states that the safety question is decidable for systems 
of bounded size, but that any algorithm which decides safety can 
(1 ) be expected to require enormous amounts of time. 
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Harrison, Huzzo, and Ullman also considered a highly 
constrained class of systems permitting only "mono-operational" 
commands which perform at most one elementary operation. This 
unrealistically severe constraint only improves matters slightly. 
• The s e t of safe mono-operational systems is 
f p \ 
recursive; however, its decision problem is MP complete. 
In other words, while the safety of a mono-operational 
systen is decidable, proving its safety can be expected to 
require exponential time in the worst case. And, though finding 
a proof of unsafety is NP hard, such a proof is short, amounting 
simply to a command sequence which generates a leak (and whose 
length is bounded by a polynomial function of the size of the 
system). 
3. Theories for funeral Pr°J:ict_ion systems 
As a prelude to theories of protection we review the basic 
concepts of theorem-proving systems. A formal language L is a 
recursive subset of the set of all possible strings over a given 
finite alphabet; the members of L are called sentences. 
A deductive theory T over a formal language L consists 
of a set A of axioms, where A C L, and a finite set of rules 
of inference, which are recursive relations over L. The set of 
theorems of T is defined inductively by: 
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(a) if t is an axiom (i.e., if t 6 A), then t is a theorem 
of T; and 
(b) if t 1, ..., t k are theorems of T and <t 1,...,t k,t> G R 
for some rule of inference R, then t is a theorem of T. 
Thus every theorem t of T has a proof which is a finite 
sequence <t^,..,,t n> of sentences such that t = t and each 
t^ is either an axiom or follows from some subset of t^ 
by a rule of inference. We write T I- t to indicate that 
t is a theorem of T or is provable in T. 
Two theories T and T' are said to be equivalent if they 
have the same set of theorems. Equivalent theories need not have 
the same axioms or rules of inference. 
A theory T is recursively axiomatizable if it has (or is 
equivalent to a theory with) a recursive set of axioms. The set 
of theorems of any recursively axiomatizable theory is 
recursively enumerable: we can generate effectively all finite 
sequences of sentences, check each to see if it is a proof, and 
enter in the enumeration the final sentence of any sequence which 
is a proof. 
A theory T is decidable if its theorems form a recursive 
set. 
Since the set of safe protection systems is not recursively 
enumerable, it cannot be the set of theorems of a recursively 
axiomatizable theory. This means that the set of all safe 
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protection systems cannot be generated effectively by rules of 
inference from a finite (or even recursive) set of safe systems. 
(Note that this does not rule out the possibility of effectively 
generating smaller, but still interesting classes of safe 
systems.) This observation can be refined, as we proceed to do, 
to establish further limitations on any recursively axiomatizable 
theory of protection. 
Definition 3 • 1 • A representation of safety over a formal 
language L is an effective map p —> t from protection 
systems to sentences of L. 
We wish to interpret t as a statement of the safety of 
the protection system p. 
Def ini tion 3^2. A theory T is adequate for proving safety 
if and only if there is a representation p —> t of safety such 
that 
T |- t if and only if p is safe. 
Analogs of the classical Church and Codel theorems for the 
undecidability and incompleteness of formal theories of 
arithmetic follow for formal theories of protection systems. 
Theorem 3.1. Any theory T adequate for proving safety 
must be undecidable. 
This theorem follows from Theorem 2.1 by noting that, were 
8 
there an adequate decidable T, we could decide whether or not a 
protection system p were safe by checking whether or not 
Theorem 3 • 2. There is no recursively axiomatizable theory 
T which is adequate for proving safety. 
This theorem follows from Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. If T were 
adequate and recursively axiomatizable, we could decide the 
safety of p by enumerating simultaneously the theorems of T 
and the set of unsafe systems; eventually, either t will 
appear in the list of theorems or p will appear in the list of 
unsafe systems, enabling us to decide the safety of p. 
Theorem 3.2 shows that, given any recursively axiomatizable 
theory T and any representation p —> t of safety, there is 
some protection system whose safety either is established 
incorrectly by T or is not established when it should be. This 
result in itself is of limited interest for two reasons: it is 
not constructive (i.e., it does not show how to find such a p); 
and, in practice, we may be willing to settle for inadequate 
theories as long as they are sound, that is, as long as they do 
not err by falsely establishing the safety of unsafe systems. 
The next theorem overcomes the first limitation, showing how to 
construct a protection system p which is unsafe if and only if 
T !- t ; the idea is to design the commands of p so that they 
can simulate a Turing machine that "hunts" for a proof of the 
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safety of p; if and when a sequence of commands finds such a 
proof, it generates a leak. If the theory T is sound, then 
such a protection system p must be safe but its safety cannot 
be provable in T. 
Pjr.C.iJliiiPJl 3^3 • A theory T together with a representation 
p -> t of safety is sound if and only if p is safe whenever r 
T ! - t . 
P 
Theorem 3•3• Given any recursively axiomatizable theory T 
and any representation of safety in T, one can construct a 
protection system p for which T I- t p if and only if p is 
unsafe. Furthermore, if T is sound, then p must be safe, but 
its safety is not provable in T. 
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 in [HRU76] shows how to 
define, given an indexing [M^} of Turing machines and an 
indexing ^ P ^ o f Protection systems, a recursive function f 
such that 
(a) K^ halts <=> Pf(i) unsafe. 
Since T is recursively axiomatizable and the map p -> t is 
computable, there is a recursive function g such that 
(b) T tp_ <-> y g(i) halts; 
the Turing machine Mg(i) simply enumerates all theorems of T, 
halting if t is found. Ry the Recursion Theorem [Rogers, 
pi 
Section 11.2], one can find effectively an index j such that 
(c) Mj halts <z> Mg(f(j)) halts. 
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Combining (a), (b), and (c) , and letting p = pf(j)> we get 
(d) T t p <=> M R ( f C j ) ) halts 
<=> Mj halts 
<=> p = pf(j) i s u n s a f e i 
as was to be shown. 
Now suppose that T is sound. Then t cannot be a 
theorem of T lest p be simultaneously safe by soundness and 
unsafe by (d). Hence, T 1/ t , and p is safe by (d). [] 
The unprovability of the safety of a protection system p 
in a given sound theory T does not imply p's safety is 
unprovable in every theory. We can, for example, augment T by 
adding t to its axioms. However, Theorem 3-3 states that 
there will exist another safe p' whose safety is unprovable in 
the new theory T'. In other words, this abstract view shows 
that systems for proving safety are necessarily incomplete: no 
single effective deduction system can be used to settle all 
questions of safety. 
The process of extending protection theories to encompass 
systems not provably safe in previous theories creates a 
progression of ever stronger deductive theories. With the 
stronger theories, proofs of safety can be shortened by unbounded 
amounts relative to the weaker theories. (Godel [G6del3&] 
discussed this phenomenon in logic and Plum [Blumfi?] discussed 
similar phenomena in computational complexity.) 
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Theorens 3.2 and 3 . 3 force us to settle for attempting to 
construct sound, but necessarily inadequate, theories of 
protection. What goals might we seek to achieve in constructing 
such a theory T? At the least, we would want T to be 
nontrivial; theories that were sound because they had no theorems 
would be singularly uninteresting. We might also hope that the 
systems whose safety was provable in T, when added to the 
recursively enumerable set of unsafe systems, would form a 
recursive set. If this were so, then we could at least determine 
whether T was of any use in attempting to establish the safety 
or unsafety of a particular protection system p before 
beginning a search for a proof or disproof of p's safety. The 
next theorem shows that this hope cannot be fulfilled. 
Theorem 3.^. Given any recursively axiomatizable theory T 
and any sound representation of safety in T, the set 
X = { p: T !— t or p unsafe } 
is not recursive. 
P_roof. If X were recursive, then the safety of a 
protection system p could be decided as follows. First, we 
check to see if p is in X. If it is not, then it must be 
safe. If it is, then we enumerate simultaneously the theorems of 
T and the unsafe systems, stopping when we eventually find 
either a proof of p's safety or the fact that p is unsafe. 
[ ] 
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^ • for protection systems of bounded size 
Real systems are finite. Some systems are designed for a 
fixed maximum number of users; others are designed to be 
extendable to any number of users, but at any given time are 
configured to handle only a given finite number. 
If we consider finite systems in which the number of objects 
and domains of access cannot grow beyond the number present in 
the initial configuration, then the safety question becomes 
decidable, although any decision procedure is likely to require 
enormous amounts of time (cf. Theorem 2.3). This doubtless rules 
out practical mechanical safety tests for these systems. 
However, this does not rule out successful safety tests 
constructed by hand: ingenious or lucky people might always be 
able to find proofs faster than any mechanical method. We show 
now that even this hope is ill-founded. 
Although we can always obtain shorter safety proofs by 
choosing a proof system in which the rules of inference are more 
complicated, it makes little sense to employ proof systems whose 
rules are so complex that it is difficult to decide whether an 
alleged proof is valid. We shall regard a logical system as 
"reasonable1" if we can decide whether a given string of symbols 
constitutes a proof in the system in time which is a polynomial 
function of the string's length. Practical logical systems are 
reasonable by this definition. We show now that, corresponding 
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to any reasonable.proof system, there are protection systems 
which are bounded in size, but whose safety proofs or disproofs 
cannot be expected to have lengths bounded by polynomial 
functions of the size of the protection systems. 
Theorem H.1. For the class of protection systems in which 
the number of objects and domains of access is bounded, safety 
(or unsafety) is polynomial verifiable by some reasonable logical 
system if and only if PSPACE = NP, that is, if and only if any 
problem solvable in polynomial space is solvable in 
( ? ) nondeterministic polynomial time. 
Ry Theorem 2.3, the safety and unsafety 
problems for systems of bounded size are both in PSPACE. Hence, 
if PSPACE z >1P, then there would be MP-time Turing machines to 
decide both safety and unsafety. Given such machines, we could 
define a reasonable logical system in which safety and unsafety 
were polynomial verifiable: the ''axioms" would correspond to the 
initial configurations of the Turing machines and the "rules of 
inference" to the transition tables for the machines. 
(=>) Also by Theorem 2.3, any problem in PSPACF is 
reducible to a question concerning the safety (or unsafety) of a 
protection system whose size is bounded by a polynomial function 
of the size of the original problem. Mow if the safety (or 
unsafety) of protection systems with bounded size were polynomial 
verifiable, we could decide safety (or unsafety) in NP-time by 
1 'I 
first '"guessing" a proof and then verifying that it was a proof 
(performing both tasks in polynomial time). By Theorem 2.3, we 
could then solve any problem in PSPACE in NP-time, showing that 
PSPACE = NP. [] 
Since the above result applies equally to proofs of safety 
and unsafety, one must expect that there are systems for which 
will be just as difficult and costly to penetrate the system as 
to prove that it can (or cannot) be done. In mono-operational 
systems, however, the situation is quite different. 
Theorem .2. The unsafety of mono-operational systems is 
polynomial verifiable. 
Proof. This result follows from Theorem 2.H, which shows 
that the unsafety question for mono-operational systems is 
solvable in NP-time. Alternatively, we simply observe that to 
demonstrate unsafety, one need only exhibit a command sequence 
leading to a leak. From [MRU76] we know that there are short 
unsafe command sequences if any exist at all: an upper bound on 
the length of such sequences is g(m+1)(n+1), where g is the 
number of generic rights, m the number of domains of access, 
and n the number of objects. Thus an unsafe sequence (if it 
exists) has a length bounded by a simple polynomial function of 
the system size . [ ] 
15 
By Theorems 2.3 and ^.2, proofs of unsafety for mono-
operational systems are short, but the time to find the proofs 
cannot be guaranteed to be short; at the worst we might have to 
enumerate each of the sequences of length g(m+1)(n+1) that 
could produce a leak. However, while proofs of unsafety are 
short for mono-operational systems, proofs of safety are not. 
Theorem • For mono-operational systems, safety is 
polynomial verifiable if and only if NP is closed under 
complement.^ ̂  
Proof. If MP were closed under complement, then safety 
would be in MP because unsafety is in MP by Theorerr 4.2. Thus 
there would be a nondeterministic Turing machine for checking 
safety in polynomial time, which would demonstrate that safety is 
polynomial verifiable. 
Conversely, suppose that safety were polynomial verifiable. 
We could then construct a nondeterministic Turing machine which 
would guess a proof of safety and then check it in polynomial 
time; hence safety would be in NP. But unsafety is in NP by 
Theorem and if any NP complete problem has its complement in 
MP, then NP is closed under complement [Kar75]. [] 
These results imply that system penetrators have a slight 
adv,-mtage when challenging mono-operations systems: any system 
that can bp penctrntdl lias n short command sequence for doing so. 
However, it may still take enormous amounts of time to find such 
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sequences, as no systematic method of finding an unsafe command 
sequence in polynomial-bounded time is likely to be found. 
5. Iovlar_ds safe protection systems 
Our primary interest in studying the provability of safety 
questions for protection systems is metaphysical: understanding 
the fundamental limits of our abilities to build provably secure 
computer systems. The results confirm widely-held suspicions 
that there is no hope of proving the security of arbitrary 
systems in any systematic or economical fashion. Moreover, they 
suggest that practical restrictions leading to tractable proofs 
of safety may be hard to find. 
Our results for unbounded systems began from earlier results 
that showed how to encode an arbitrary Turing machine's 
configurations into the states of an access control matrix, 
leading thereby to the conclusion that proving a system safe is 
equivalent to solving the halting problem. We extended this 
result to demonstrate that any fixed logical system is inadequate 
for establishing the safety of all protection systems: there will 
always be a protection system whose safety is neither provable 
nor disprovable. We outlined the construction of such a system. 
When attention is shifted to the protection systems of 
bounded size we are likely to encounter in practice, the earlier 
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questions become decidable, but intractably so. The set of safe 
protection systems of bounded size is decidable now, but its 
decision problem is complete among problems solvable in 
polynomial space, which means that any decision procedure is 
likely to require an amount of time at least exponential in the-
size of the protection system. It also means that safety proofs 
or disproofs are likely to be exponentially long'(again in the 
size of the protection system). 
As an illustration.of restrictions within which proofs could 
be tractable, we considered protection systems with mono-
operational commands- For these systems, the length of a proof 
of unsafety can be bounded by the product of the dimensions of 
the protection system; but proofs of safety are still long. 
Moreover, though a proof of unsafety may be short, finding it is 
likely to require at least exponential time. 
In another study, Harrison and Ruzzo [HaR76] considered 
other protection systems whose commands are "monotone'" , i.e. 
whose commands never delete any domains, objects, or generic 
rights from the system. Since monotone systems are powerful 
enough to simulate Turing machines, all the above results apply 
to them as well. 
These results support skepticism toward proving systems 
safe, for there is no single, systematic, general approach to 
establishing the safety or unsafety of arbitrary protection 
IP, 
systems. Hence we are forced to deal with approaches that are 
less general, or that attack the problem from a different point 
of view. Following are several possible approaches to the 
problem, 
(1) Despite the undecidability and intractability results, 
we can still try to prove particular protection systems safe. 
After all, the incompleteness, undecidabi1ity, and intractability 
results in number theory have not stopped mathematicians from 
trying to prove interesting theorems, and so our results for 
protection systems should not stop computer scientists from 
trying to prove the safety of interesting protection systems. 
Our results merely stand as a warning that proving systems safe 
is not likely to be easy. 
(2) In this respect, it would be be useful to develop 
techniques for proving the safety of sufficiently simple 
protection systems. For example, Lipton and Snyder [L1ST7] 
investigated a class of systems which possesses a linear-time 
algorithm for deciding safety. On the other hand, the same 
authors [LiS78] studied another class of protection systems whose 
safety question is equivalent to a problem about vector addition 
systems (which seems to require at least exponential.time even 
though it is decidable). Further study of such classes should 
prove fruitful. 
(3) Rather than trying to guarantee the safety of a 
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protection system, which might be expensive, we might instead 
seek to give shorter demonstrations that the system is "probably 
safe" or "safe beyond a reasonable doubt". One possible approach 
night be to construct theories of protection which occasionally, 
though with very low probability, produced a "proof" that an 
unsafe system was safe. 
(4) Finally, recognizing the well-known fact that certain 
access paths, known as "covert channels", may well be too 
expensive to eliminate [Lip75], we might concentrate on trying to 
prove that any way of compromising a given protection system must 
likewise be too expensive. Given this approach, the question of 
central importance would not be whether we could prove that a 
system is safe, but whether we could prove that finding a breach 
of security is, say, NP-hard or even harder. 
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Footnotes 
^ ^ M o r e precisely, it was shown that the safety problem for these 
systems can.be solved in polynomial time (time proportional to 
a polynomial function of the length of the description of the 
system) if and only if PSPACE = P, i.e. if and only if any 
problem which can be solved in polynomial space can also be 
solved in polynomial time. Although the relationship between 
time and space is not well understood, it is believed that 
PSPACE i P; in fact, it is believed that exponential time is 
required for such problems. 
(2) 
The UP complete problems consititute a large class of 
problems, one of which is the well-known traveling salesman 
problem; if any one of these problems could he solved in 
polynomial time, then every problem in the class could be 
solved in polynomial time. However, it is widely believed 
that exponential time is required to solve these problems. 
See [AHU75] for a more thorough treatment of MP complete 
problems. 
^ ^ P S P A C E is the class of all problems which can be solved in 
polynomial space. It is known that any problem which can be 
solved nondeterministically in polynomial space is in PSPACE, 
but it is widely believed that PSPACE t MP. 
( 2| ) 
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